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ABSTRACT This paper investigates the interplay between the Social Cash Transfer Programme (SCTP) and
the Farm Input Subsidy Programme (FISP) in Malawi. We take advantage of data collected from a 17-month
evaluation of a sample of households eligible to receive SCTP, which also provided information about inclusion
into FISP. We estimate two types of synergies: i) the complementarity between SCTP and FISP, that is whether the
impact of both interventions run together is larger than the sum of the impacts of these interventions when run
separately, and ii) the incremental impact of receiving FISP when a household already receives SCTP, as well as
the incremental impact of receiving SCTP when a household already receives FISP. The analysis shows that there
are synergies between the two policy interventions, mainly in terms of incremental impacts of each programme
over the other, in increasing expenditure, agricultural production and livestock.
1. Introduction
There is a growing body of literature on the impacts of policy interventions implemented in develop-
ing countries to tackle hunger and poverty in the short and long run. These programmes include cash
transfers, food, supplements, provision of subsidies for agricultural inputs and activities, provision of
information and training sessions on matters broadly related to education and health. It is plausible that
there are interactions between these programmes, yet programme evaluators are generally only able to
estimate the stand-alone impact of each programme without much attention to the potential synergies
and degree of complementarity between them. However, this kind of analysis is relevant for several
reasons. First, resources are scarce: it is necessary to run programmes that reinforce each other rather
than programmes that reciprocally reduce their effectiveness. Second, if the synergies and the degree
of complementarity is high and significant, policy-makers could in principle reduce the resources
allocated to various programmes to reach the same desired results. Third, if the degree of substitut-
ability is high and significant, policy-makers should carefully prioritise desired outcomes and define a
realistic timeline to avoid ‘crowding out’ the effects of the various programmes.
This paper focuses on the experience of a sub-Saharan country, Malawi, in which in recent years the
Social Cash Transfer Programme (SCTP) and the Farm Input Subsidy Programme (FISP) have been
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implemented simultaneously as instruments for reducing poverty and vulnerability to hunger among
poor households that mostly rely on agriculture as their main source of income.
FISP and SCTP are expected to have impacts on several outcomes. The FISP is expected to directly
influence production decisions, but its contribution towards reducing hunger and poverty is mediated
by factors such as access to land, water and labour for food production, responsiveness of yields to
increased inputs, climatic factors, and the relative position of small poor farmers as net buyers or net
sellers of grains in food markets. The SCTP is a welfare intervention that acts directly on the
consumption capability of the recipients: the additional cash can be used directly to increase both
quantity and quality of food. Recipients of the cash can, in addition, use this for purchasing productive
inputs and assets. Several prior studies focus on the isolated impact of SCTP (Asfaw, Pickmans, &
Davis, 2015; Covarrubias, Davis, & Winters, 2012; Handa, Angeles, Abdoulayi, Mvula, & Tsoka,
2015b) and FISP in Malawi (among others, Arndt, Pauw, & Thurlow, 2016; Chirwa & Dorward, 2013;
Dorward et al., 2013; Jayne & Ricker-Gilbert, 2011).
This paper is the first attempt to shed light on the interplay between FISP and SCTP using
survey data. More specifically, the paper investigates the impacts on poor and ultra-poor house-
holds when they participate in either FISP or SCTP alone or when they participate in both
programmes simultaneously. We focus on a variety of outcomes, including household expenditure
(food and non-food), food security and on contributing outcomes such as productive activities
(crop production, input use) and livestock. In assessing the impacts of the two combined inter-
ventions, we focus on two types of synergies: i) the complementarity between SCTP and FISP,
that is whether the impact of both interventions run together is larger than the sum of the impacts
of these interventions when run separately; ii) the incremental impact of receiving FISP when a
household already receives SCTP, as well as the incremental impact of receiving SCTP when a
household already receives FISP (Gertler, Martinez, Premand, Rawlings, & Vermeersch, 2011).
For the empirical analysis we take advantage of data collected from a 17-month evaluation (2013–
2014) on a sample of households eligible to receive SCTP, which also provided information about
inclusion into FISP. Since only the assignment into SCTP is random, we deal with potential
sample selection issues adopting Uysal’s (2015) strategy that allows us to obtain doubly robust
estimates of causal effects through a combination of regression analysis, implemented through
difference-in-difference approach, and generalised propensity score weighting adjustment.
Moreover, since the impacts of the two programmes are likely to differ across different groups
of the study population, we carryout the analysis by groups of households with different labour
endowments (unconstrained versus constrained households), as well as on the whole sample. We
define a household as labour constrained if there is no able-bodied member of the household who
is fit-to-work, that is no adult without chronic illness and/or disabilities. Labour constraints are
factors that can be considered proxies of wealth and capacity to generate income and therefore
likely to mediate the effect of both SCTP and FISP.
The analysis shows that, despite a lack of coordination, there are synergies between SCTP and FISP
in increasing expenditure, the value of agricultural production, crop production and livestock, and to a
lesser extent, in improving food security. More specifically, we find that SCTP and FISP are
complementary instruments in increasing total household expenditure and expenditure on food and
education, and in increasing the value of production, production of crops, and livestock. Furthermore,
the heterogeneity analysis based on labour constraints shows that the positive synergies between SCTP
and FISP in increasing household expenditures are stronger for labour unconstrained households,
while the positive synergies in increasing the value of production, crops production and livestock are
stronger for labour constrained households.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses previous evidence on the impacts of
input subsidies and social protection programmes in sub-Saharan Africa. Section 3 describes FISP and
SCTP. Section 4 presents the empirical approach and the estimation method. The main results are
presented and discussed in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes and discusses the policy implications.
2 N. Pace et al.
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2. Literature review
This paper fits into three branches of the literature (the contributions related to the first two are
reported in Appendix A in the Supplementary Materials): i) the impact evaluation of social protection
interventions; ii) the analysis of agricultural subsidy programmes in low income countries; and iii) the
joint evaluation of social protection and agricultural development interventions. Given the main focus
of this paper, in this section we focus only on contributions relating to the experience of African
countries. For contributions concerning the experiences of countries in Latin America or Asia we refer
to three broad literature reviews by Tirivayi, Knowles and Davis (2016), Jayne and Rashid (2013), and
Veras, Knowles, Daidone and Tirivayi (2017) respectively for the impact evaluation of social protec-
tion interventions, the effects of agricultural subsidy programmes, and the combined effects and
synergies between the two.
2.1. Joint evaluation of social protection and agricultural interventions in sub-Saharan Africa
To the best of our knowledge, only six papers enter into this category, that is Carter, Laajaj, and Yang
(2015), Daidone et al. (2017), Beegle, Galasso, and Goldberg (2017), Ellis and Maliro (2013), Matita
and Chirwa (2014) and Thome, Taylor, and Filipski (2014).
Carter et al. (2015) investigate the complementarities between input subsidies and a saving-oriented
financial services intervention on household consumption and asset holdings in Mozambique. In their
experiment, study participants were randomly offered either a subsidy for modern agricultural inputs,
entrance into a saving facilitation programme, or both. They examine the impacts of subsidies and
savings, separately and together, and they find that from the standpoint of raising consumption,
subsidies and savings appear to be substitutes rather than complements. Daidone et al. (2017) study
the combination of two types of agricultural and social protection programmes in Lesotho: the Child
Grants Programme (CGP), an unconditional cash transfer, and the FAO-Lesotho Linking Food
Security to Social Protection Programme (LFSSP) which provides vegetable seeds and training on
homestead gardening. Their results show positive effects on homestead gardening and productive
agricultural activities which seem to be driven by the combination of the two programmes, more than
the programmes per se. Beegle et al. (2017) marginally focus on the complementarities between the
Malawi public works programme and FISP, finding no effect on the expenditure for fertiliser, nor on
the quantity of fertiliser used. Ellis and Maliro (2013) compare several features of fertiliser subsidies
and cash transfers, such as impacts on vulnerability to hunger, unintended effects, targeting accuracy,
coverage boundaries, budgeting aspects and political dimensions. These comparisons suggest that
input subsidies and cash transfers may be complements across a range of attributes and that they
compensate for each other’s weaknesses. Matita and Chirwa (2014) claim that targeting of SCTP and
FISP should be better harmonised to avoid households participating in both programmes simulta-
neously. Finally, Thome et al. (2014) explore the synergies between SCTP and FISP using a local
economy-wide impact evaluation model. Using national representative data from the Integrated
Household Survey, wave 3, (IHS3) they show that the combination of FISP and SCTP offers the
dual advantage of stimulating production and creating local growth linkages while better targeting the
poor. They find that input subsidies significantly enhance the potential of SCTP to stimulate growth in
the rural economy.
3. Background of the programmes
3.1. Farm input subsidy programme
The FISP was initiated in 2005–2006. At that time it targeted approximately 50 per cent of farmers in
the country and distributed fertilisers for maize production, as well as vouchers for tobacco fertilisers
and for improved maize seeds. The FISP is financed by the Government with international donor
Evaluating synergies of development programmes 3
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support (Chirwa, Matita, & Dorward, 2011). Its primary objectives are to achieve national food-
sufficiency and to increase income among resource-poor smallholder farmers through increased maize
and legume production driven by access to improved agricultural inputs.
This kind of intervention followed decades of agricultural policy interventions that varied in terms
of generosity and targeting criteria. From the mid-1970s to the early 1990s the Government financed
a universal fertiliser subsidy, subsidised smallholder credit, and controlled maize prices. Despite
these interventions, many households continued to suffer from severe food insecurity, particularly
after the poor 2004/5 production season. This led to a significant political emphasis on larger
subsidies, and in 2005/6 the Government decided to implement a large-scale input subsidy pro-
gramme across the country. Over time, key features of the programme have undergone substantial
changes in design and implementation summarised by Chirwa and Dorward (2013) and Dorward
and Chirwa (2011).
Currently, the programme targets smallholder farmers who are resource-poor but own a piece
of land. The targeting criteria also recognise special vulnerable groups, such as child-headed,
female-headed and orphan-headed households, and households with members affected by HIV/
AIDS. These criteria remain broad and there are variations in the use of the targeting guidelines
in different communities, particularly as the number of eligible households tends to be much
larger than the available number of fertiliser coupons. Kilic, Whitney, and Winters (2013) find
that FISP does not exclusively target the poor in Malawi. On the contrary, it primarily reaches
the middle of the income distribution.1 In 2015, the Government implemented some reforms to
allow direct private sector retailing, reducing the subsidy level (from 95% to 80%). Furthermore,
it selected 1.5 million beneficiaries at random amongst a list of maize producers, with the
intention of alternating the farmers on annual basis and providing the subsidies to all farmers
once in three years.
Several aspects of FISP implementation are currently under discussion: i) alignment of FISP to the
National Agricultural Policy to contribute to its overall objective of increasing national production,
productivity and household incomes; ii) stimulate fertiliser use, crop diversification and sustainable
land management more actively; iii) change the targeting criteria, gradually reducing the total number
of beneficiaries and/or reduce the subsidy level.
These changes should lead to a gradual shift towards more productive farmers and to a ‘reallocation’
of poor subsistence farmers, previously included in FISP, into social protection programmes.
3.2. Social cash transfer programme
The SCTP is an unconditional cash transfer aimed at reducing poverty and hunger among
vulnerable households and at increasing school enrolment. At the national level, SCTP is managed
by the Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Welfare (MGCSW), with policy and design
oversight by the Ministry of Finance, Economic Development and Planning (MFEDP). The
programme is explicitly targeted towards ultra-poor households, defined as households unable to
meet their most basic urgent needs, including food and essential non-food items, and labour-
constrained households. A pilot of this programme was initiated in 2006 in the district of Mchinji.
The 2007–2008 impact evaluation of the pilot demonstrated that the programme had a range of
positive outcomes including increased food security, ownership of agricultural tools and curative
care seeking (Covarrubias et al., 2012; Miller, Tsoka, & Reichert, 2010). Since then the pro-
gramme has undergone some changes in targeting and operations, as well as a significant
expansion to 18 out of 28 districts in the country. As of April 2015, it reached over 100,000
households.2 The size of the transfer to each household is adjusted to the number of household
members and their characteristics. As of May 2015, households with only one adult received bi-
monthly payments which were equivalent to a monthly amount of 1000 Malawian Kwacha
(MWK), that is around 3USD and since then 1700 MWK, plus additional amounts for the number
of children enrolled in primary or secondary school.
4 N. Pace et al.
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4. Empirical analysis
4.1. Econometric method
The estimation of the causal effects of SCTP and FISP is slightly more complex than general impact
evaluation of randomised control trials for two reasons: 1) we are considering three intervention
groups (only SCTP, only FISP, and SCTP and FISP received jointly) that have to be compared with the
control group, as opposed to a unique treatment group compared with the control group; 2) only
inclusion into SCTP was randomised and in principle the groups may be different at baseline. If this
problem occurs, then estimates that do not take into account these differences are biased. In order to
deal with these features of the study design, we adopt a doubly robust method implemented by Uysal
(2015) which combines regression modelling (based in our paper on a difference-in-difference
approach) and Generalised Propensity Score (GPS) weighting approach by Imbens (2000) applied to
multiple treatments’ intervention. The GPS weighting and the difference in difference estimation allow
us to control, respectively, for selection on observable and time-constant unobservable factors in the
households. However, it should be noted that these two methods do not allow us to control for
unobservable factors which may be time variant and could be correlated with the receipt of FISP.
We are interested in estimating the causal effects of the treatment on several outcome variables
where the treatment of interest, Ti, takes the integer values between 0 and K (in this paper K is equal to
three). Consider N units (households) which are drawn from a large population. For each household i,
i ¼ 1; :::; N , the triple (Yi, Ti, Xi) is observed. Xi denotes the vector of characteristics at household and
community level (covariates) for the ith household. Yi represents the outcomes for household i. For
each household there is a set of potential outcomes (Yi0; :::; YiK). Yit denotes the outcome for each
household, for which Ti ¼ t where t 2 = ¼ ð0; :::KÞ. Only one of the potential outcomes is observed
depending on the treatment status. Indeed, households can be included in one of the three treatment
groups: only SCTP, only FISP, or both SCTP and FISP received jointly. Adopting the framework
introduced by Rubin (1974), the observed outcome Yi can be written in terms of treatment indicator,
DitðTiÞ, and the potential outcomes, Yit:
Yi ¼
XK
t¼0
DitðTiÞYit (1)
where DitðTiÞ is the indicator of receiving the treatment t for household i:
DitðTiÞ ¼ 1; if Ti ¼ t0; otherwise

We are interested in estimating an intention to treat effect, which is the average effect of the treatment
m relative to treatment l :
τml ¼ E½Yim  Yil ¼ μm  μl (2)
τml measures the mean effect of treatment over the entire population.
An important assumption for the identification of the treatment effect is the strict overlap assump-
tion which can be defined considering the concept of GPS by Imbens (2000). The GPS is the
conditional probability of receiving a treatment (in our paper only SCTP, only FISP or both SCTP
and FISP received jointly) given the pre-treatment variables. It is defined as follow:
rðt; xÞ; Pr½Ti ¼ t Xi ¼ x ¼ E½DitðTiÞj jXi ¼ x (3)
The strict overlap assumption states that no value of the covariates can deterministically predict receipt
(absence) of treatment. More formally:
Evaluating synergies of development programmes 5
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0 < ε < Pr½Ti ¼ tjXi ¼ x, for some ε > 0, "t 2 = and "x in the support of X .
Under this assumption, together with the conditional independence assumption as defined by
Imbens (2000), treatment effects can be estimated through parametric regression. Using the definition
of the observed outcome in Equation (1), the regression model can be written as in Equation (4):
Yi ¼
XK
t¼0
μtDitðTiÞ þ
XK
t¼0
DitðTiÞðXi  X Þ0αt þ εi (4)
The unconditional means μt and αt are estimated by minimising the objective function, that is the sum
of the squared residuals:
min
~μt ; ~αt
1
N
XN
i¼1
Yi 
XK
t¼0
~μtDitðTiÞ 
XK
t¼0
DitðTiÞðXi  X Þ0~αt
 !2
;min
~μt ; ~αt
1
N
XN
i¼1
~ε2i (5)
Using the estimators μ^regm and μ^
reg
l (where the superscript ‘reg’ refers to the regression method), τml can
be estimated as
τ^regml ¼ μ^regm  μ^regl (6)
The second approach followed for our doubly robust estimation consists of constructing the propensity
score weighting type estimators for the treatment effect parameters. Imbens (2000) shows that, as for the
binary case, the unconditional means of the potential outcomes can be identified using GPS by weighting:
E
YiDitðTiÞ
rðt; XiÞ
 
¼ E½Yit (7)
Based on this identification result, the treatment effect estimator is given by
τ^weml ¼
1
N
XN
i¼1
YiDimðTiÞ
r^ðm; XiÞ 
1
N
XN
i¼1
YiDilðTiÞ
r^ðl; XiÞ (8)
where r^ðt; XiÞ is the estimated GPS and the superscript ‘we’ denotes the weighting method. To get
doubly robust estimators for the treatment effect, we combine the weighted regression method with the
weights related to the weighting identification. In practice, we estimate the regression model in
Equation (4) by a weighted least squares regression with the following minimisation problem:
min
~μt ; ~αt
1
N
XN
i¼1
XK
t¼0
DitðTiÞ
r^ðt; XiÞ
 !
Yi 
XK
t¼0
~μtDitðTiÞ 
XK
t¼0
DitðTiÞðXi  X Þ0~αt
 !2
(9)
Using μ^drm and μ^
dr
l instead of the unweighted regression estimators μ^
reg
m and μ^
reg
l , we are able to obtain
doubly robust estimates of τml:
τ^drml ¼ μ^drm  μ^drl (10)
We estimated the standard errors using the asymptotic variance formula proposed by Uysal (2015).
Following the arguments in Wooldridge (2007), Uysal (2015) derived the asymptotic distribution for
the estimators of the treatment parameters in cases in which the GPS, r^ðt; X Þ, is estimated by
6 N. Pace et al.
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multinomial response model. This approach adapts particularly well to our case, since we estimated
the GPS by multinomial logit regression, as will be explained in the following section.
4.2. Data and regression analysis
This study is based on data collected from a 17-month evaluation (2013–2014) of a sample of
households eligible to receive SCTP, which also provided information about inclusion into FISP.
Data collection for this study and preliminary analysis were implemented by the Carolina Population
Center at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (UNC-CH) and the Centre for Social
Research of the University of Malawi (CSR UNIMA) (Handa et al., 2015b). The UNC-CH and
CSR UNIMA took advantage of an expansion in SCTP to build an experimental ‘delay-entry’ control
group implemented in two stages, referred to as random selection and random assignment. In the first
stage, in the districts of Salima and Mangochi four Traditional Authorities (TAs) were randomly
selected by lottery. Thereafter, the MGCSW targeted eligible households and their corresponding
Village Clusters (VCs). The selection of eligible households was done through a proxy means test and
a community-based approach with oversight provided by the local District Commissioner’s Office and
the District Social Welfare Office. Overall, about 3500 households were included in the study sample.
Once the baseline survey was completed in July/August 2013, in the second stage, half of the VCs in
the study sample were randomly assigned to a treatment group and entered the programme immedi-
ately, while the other half served as a control group in order to measure the impact of the programme,
and were supposed to enter the programme at the end of the evaluation period. The first follow-up
survey was scheduled after 12 months from baseline when beneficiary households would have
received 8–10 months of transfers. However, due to the delay in the start of the payment (May
2014), the follow-up was postponed until November 2014, at which time beneficiary households
would have received five payments only (10 months’ worth). These data have already been exten-
sively analysed by Handa et al. (2015b) and Asfaw et al. (2015), focusing exclusively on the stand-
alone impact of SCTP on a broad range of outcome variables that included household expenditure,
food security, productive activities, and labour supply among others.
With respect to the original sample, for this paper we selected a subsample in order to identify the
stand-alone impact of SCTP and FISP, their synergies, and the joint impact of FISP and SCTP when
received jointly. We select 1607 households (interviewed at both baseline and follow-up) that are
divided into four groups: control households that neither received SCTP nor FISP (control group);
households treated exclusively under SCTP (treatment SCTP); households treated exclusively under
FISP (treatment FISP); and households treated under both programmes simultaneously (treatment
SCTP&FISP) (respectively, 38.33, 30.18, 14.87, and 16.6% of the sample). We excluded from the
sample the following categories of households: i) included in FISP in both baseline and follow-up
(1122); and ii) included in FISP at baseline and in SCTP at follow-up (634).3 This kind of selection
has advantages and disadvantages. The exclusion of these two groups of households allows us to
obtain a clean setting of mutually exclusive groups over which to estimate the impacts of the two
programmes in isolation and in combination. However, this selection procedure drastically reduces the
sample size (from 3363 to 1607 households interviewed both at baseline and follow-up).4 Potentially,
it could also affect the randomised nature of the experiment, creating groups with different character-
istics at baseline. Indeed, unlike SCTP, access to FISP was not randomised in the evaluation design. In
such a case, the identification of the programmes’ impact would be biased. In order to deal with this
potential sample selection issue, we adopt the doubly robust estimation strategy by Uysal (2015)
described in Section 4.1 (combination of regression analysis and generalised propensity score weight-
ing adjustment). Table B2 (in Appendix B in the Supplementary Materials) shows the unweighted tests
of differences between the four groups included in the study sample. As suspected, the four groups
show significant differences on a variety of baseline household characteristics and economic
indicators.
The GPS were estimated through a multinomial logit regression using data at baseline, as in
Equation (11).
Evaluating synergies of development programmes 7
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Pr Ti ¼ t½  ¼ f  þ θXið Þ (11)
The variable Pr½Ti ¼ t represents the probability of being included in one of the four groups (control,
treatment SCTP, treatment FISP, treatment SCTP&FISP). This is modelled as a function of a vector of
control variables (Xi) which includes household size and demographic composition, characteristics of the
household head, proxies of wealth (total land owned, agricultural assets, and livestock owned), distance to
the markets and district fixed effect. The GPS weights allowed to ‘rebalance’ the sample. Indeed, Table 1
shows that, with only one exception, the four groups are identical at baseline. Equation (12) presents the
regression equivalent of difference-in-difference with covariates and weighting based on GPS.
Yi; d ¼ ζ þ αD2014i þ β1SCTPi; d þ β2ðD2014i  SCTPi; dÞ þ γ1FISPi; d
þ γ2ðD2014i  FISPi; dÞ þ γ3SCTPi; d FISPi; d þ δðD2014i  SCTPi; d FISPi; dÞ
þ
X
βXi þ μi; d (12)
Table 1. Anova test for difference between groups of intervention: control, SCTP, FISP, SCTP&FISP (adjusted by
the Generalized Propensity Score weights)
C SCTP FISP SCT&FISP F-test P-value
single head of hh 0.748 0.730 0.751 0.740 0.18 0.9117
female head of hh 0.851 0.838 0.820 0.837 0.49 0.692
age of head of hh 54.495 54.161 55.087 54.719 0.150 0.927
# members in the hh 4.633 4.633 4.454 4.544 0.59 0.618
# members in the hh: 0–5 years old 0.783 0.769 0.728 0.771 0.27 0.846
# members in the hh: 6–12 years old 1.250 1.256 1.162 1.195 0.74 0.527
# members in the hh: 13–17 years old 0.905 0.905 0.873 0.891 0.11 0.956
# members in the hh: 18–64 years old 1.178 1.196 1.195 1.170 0.07 0.976
# members in the hh: > = 65 years old 0.517 0.508 0.496 0.517 0.12 0.951
# orphans in the hh 1.099 1.084 1.019 1.035 0.23 0.874
yrs of education head of hh 1.272 1.296 1.245 1.385 0.28 0.840
hh severely labour constrained 0.456 0.449 0.473 0.463 0.17 0.914
hh consumption – total 164,514.53 154,514.02 163,867.20 160,596.98 0.56 0.639
hh consumption – food and beverages 127,621.91 118,176.74 124,934.00 125,507.52 0.75 0.523
Household owns or cultivates land 0.919 0.932 0.937 0.933 0.4 0.754
Total plot area operated within hh 1.210 1.238 1.220 1.247 0.13 0.944
HH has plot that is irrigated 0.045 0.045 0.051 0.066 0.76 0.515
HH applies chemical fertiliser 0.276 0.270 0.353 0.424 9.59 0.000
HH applies organic fertiliser 0.278 0.265 0.315 0.329 1.72 0.161
HH uses pesticides 0.015 0.030 0.040 0.030 1.5 0.212
HH uses improved or hybrid seed 0.283 0.271 0.328 0.348 2.51 0.057
HH planted maize 0.872 0.872 0.877 0.884 0.12 0.951
HH planted groundnut 0.094 0.091 0.089 0.136 2.23 0.083
HH planted pigeonpea 0.098 0.111 0.068 0.115 2.14 0.094
Value of production 9505.84 9143.03 9570.90 9830.87 0.35 0.786
HH owns hand hoe 0.813 0.814 0.837 0.855 1.18 0.317
HH owns axe 0.100 0.081 0.093 0.100 0.37 0.771
HH owns panga knife 0.192 0.226 0.242 0.217 1.02 0.383
HH owns sickle 0.126 0.128 0.107 0.085 1.6 0.187
HH owns chickens now 0.126 0.128 0.107 0.085 1.6 0.187
HH owns goat or a sheep now 0.064 0.054 0.051 0.083 1.38 0.246
Total HH Expenditure for livestock 87.79 97.95 43.83 80.277 0.86 0.462
Total HH livestock sales 275.48 321.27 119.46 293.949 1.63 0.180
obs 616 485 239 267
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Yi; d is the outcome variables. SCTP and FISP are indicator variables for, respectively, exclusive
assignment to either SCTP or FISP. SCTP&FISP is an indicator variable for assignment to both
SCTP and FISP. D2014 represents the survey year and is equal to one at follow-up, zero otherwise.
X is a set of baseline household characteristics (household size and demographic composition, and
characteristics of the household head) and controls at community level (a vector of contempora-
neous cluster level prices, as well as a set of exogenous shocks and district fixed effects). μ is an
error term.
The parameters of interest are the coefficients β2, γ2 and δ which are, respectively, the treatment effect
estimates of SCTP for households treated only by SCTP, the effect of FISP for households treated only by
FISP, and the estimate of the joint impact of SCTP and FISP for households treated by both programmes.
These parameters allow us to estimate the synergies between the two programmes, as well as their
complementarity. In particular, the difference between δ (joint impact of SCTP and FISP when a
household receives both), β2 (stand-alone impact of SCTP) and γ2 (stand-alone impact of FISP), that is
δ-β2-γ2, measures the complementarity between the SCTP and FISP. The difference between δ and β2
measures the incremental impact of FISP on SCTP households. The difference between δ and γ2 measures
the incremental impact of SCTP on FISP households. Note that SCTP, FISP and SCTP&FISP represent
mutually exclusive groups. SCTP takes value one if the household is treated exclusively under SCTP, zero
otherwise. FISP takes value one if the household is treated exclusively under FISP, zero otherwise.
SCTP&FISP takes value one if the household is treated under both SCTP and FISP, zero otherwise (that is
neither of the programmes is received, or the household only benefits from one of the programmes). This
variable does not represent an interaction between SCTP and FISP. It represents a completely different
group of households. For this reason, the stand-alone impacts of SCTP and FISP are, respectively, simply
β2 and γ2, and the joint impact of SCTP and FISP is δ. See also Gertler et al. (2011).
Before proceeding to the next section, a challenge related to the analysis of FISP needs to be brought to
attention, namely the fact that households treated under FISP may receive different quantities and
combinations of maize seed and inorganic fertiliser. Unfortunately from our survey data it is not possible
to get an exact measure of subsidised seeds and subsidised fertilisers, but only the equivalent amount in
cash of FISP vouchers. Among recipients, there is some variability in the self-reported amounts, which
may be due to misreporting or under/over-reporting (Table available upon request). There is likely to be a
measurement error, which would complicate a lot of the econometrics, without a clear advantage over the
binary approach. In fact, we would need an instrument for the vouchers amount. For this reason we
decided to take into account only whether they received FISP or not without taking into account potential
differences in the amount of seeds and fertilisers received.
5. Results of the stand-alone and combined impacts of SCTP and FISP
The following sub-sections describe the main findings on a large set of outcomes, including household
expenditure, agricultural production and livestock (ownership and expenditure). Findings on the impact
on food security and use of agricultural inputs are reported in Tables D2 and D3 in Appendix D in the
Supplementary Materials. We present the results for the whole sample and by groups of households with
different labour endowments, namely labour constrained and unconstrained. This heterogeneity analysis
has not been chosen at random, rather it is justified by the relevance of labour capacity in the targeting
mechanisms of both programmes. In our analysis, a household is defined as ‘labour constrained’ if there is
no able-bodied member of the household who is fit-to-work, that is no adult without chronic illness and/or
disabilities. All estimates are doubly robust: they include a large set of control variables, namely, baseline
head of household’s characteristics, household demographic composition and size, a vector of contem-
poraneous cluster level prices, a set of exogenous shocks, and district fixed effect, and are adjusted with
the GPS weighting. Confidence intervals consider heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered at
the community level.
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5.1. Consumption expenditure
Figure 1 provides a graphical representation of the estimated stand-alone impact of SCTP and FISP,
their joint impact and their synergies on consumption expenditure per adult equivalent. The thick
horizontal bars represent the estimated coefficients, while the thin horizontal bars show the confidence
interval. The figure shows, from the left to the right, 1) the stand-alone impact of SCTP, 2) the stand-
alone impact of FISP, 3) their sum, and 4) the joint impact of SCTP and FISP when the households
benefit from both simultaneously. The difference between 4 and 3 represents the precise measure of
complementarity between the two interventions (δ − β2 − γ2).
The figure shows that the stand-alone impact of SCTP on expenditure per adult equivalent is
positive and significant but the stand-alone impact of FISP is close to zero and not statistically
significant. The exclusive receipt of cash transfer leads to an increase of expenditure of 9481
MWK, corresponding to 29 USD (at the exchange rate of 2013). This represents an increase of 21
per cent of the baseline mean value for expenditure. The joint impact is positive and significant
(10,697 MWK, equivalent to 32 USD), and it is greater than the sum of the stand-alone impacts of
SCTP and FISP. Indeed, the joint impact corresponds to a 24 per cent increase with respect to the
baseline mean of expenditure for households receiving both SCTP and FISP. Overall, the estimates
for consumption expenditure show positive synergies when households participate in both
programmes.
Table 2 shows the doubly robust estimates of the incremental impacts of SCTP on FISP and the
incremental effect of FISP on SCTP. While the former is positive and statistically significant,
corresponding to 12,289 MWK (37 USD), the latter is positive but not significant. This means that
the additional impact of cash transfers to households that received exclusively FISP would induce an
increase of expenditure per adult equivalent of 37 USD. Moreover, the heterogeneity analysis high-
lights strong differences between labour constrained and unconstrained households. Indeed, it shows
that the stand-alone impact of SCTP is larger for households defined as labour constrained (a 24%
increase relative to baseline mean). However, synergies take place only for households with labour
capacity. For this group of households, the incremental impact of SCTP on FISP is positive and
significant, equivalent to 20,505 MWK (62 USD) and the complementarity estimate is positive and
significant. It shows that the joint receipt of SCTP and FISP induces an increase of expenditure for
labour unconstrained households which is 13,412 MWK (40 USD) greater than the sum of the stand-
alone impacts of SCTP and FISP. Furthermore, the heterogeneity analysis shows that the baseline
mean of expenditure is significantly higher for labour constrained households. This seems to be
counterintuitive but is explained by differences in expenditure for food. While labour unconstrained
households consume self-produced food, labour constrained households are more likely to purchase
from the market. This explanation is supported by the differences in the baseline value of production
for labour constrained and unconstrained households, where it is significantly higher for the former
group.
-10,000
-5,000
0
5,000
10,000
15,000
20,000
25,000
SCTP FISP Sum SCTP and
FISP
Joint Effect
Figure 1. Impact on total expenditure per adult equivalent – MWK real values.
Note: Exchange rate in 2013: 1 USD = 329.4768 MWK.
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Table 3 shows the effect on several expenditure items, namely food, health, education, clothing and
footwear (the results for additional expenditure items are reported in Table C2 (in Appendix C in the
Supplementary Materials). The results for food expenditure are similar to those for total expenditure.
Indeed, the stand-alone impact of SCTP is greater for labour constrained households (the coefficient
shows an increase of 18% of the baseline per adult equivalent expenditure on food), and the stand-
alone impact of FISP is positive but not statistically significant. However, positive synergies occur
only for the group of labour unconstrained households. Looking at the estimates of other consumption
items, the results are more heterogeneous. In particular, we find synergies between SCTP and FISP for
expenditures on health, education and clothing and footwear, but not for the other consumption items.
Most of the increase in expenditure is due to SCTP.
Finally, with the exception of expenditure for clothing and footwear, the stand-alone impact of FISP
is never positive and significant. This suggests that FISP does not produce an income effect. Indeed,
when received alone, it does not release liquidity otherwise used for agricultural inputs such as
fertilisers or seeds. This result is consistent with findings of previous studies, both quantitative and
qualitative, which document a weak impact of FISP on expenditure (Chirwa & Dorward, 2013).
5.2. Agricultural production and livestock
Figure 2 provides a graphical representation of the estimated stand-alone impacts of SCTP and FISP,
the joint impact and their synergies on value of production. The joint impact is positive and significant
and there are positive synergies when households participate in both programmes in increasing the
value of production. The figure also shows that most of the increase in the value of production is due
to FISP. Indeed, while the stand-alone impact of FISP is large in size, positive and significant (5079
MKW, equivalent to 15 USD, a 53% increase from baseline values), the coefficient of SCTP is small
in size and insignificant. Table 4 provides the regression estimates for the value of production,
Table 2. Impact on total expenditure per adult equivalent – MWK real values
All Labour unconstrained Labour constrained
Total
expenditure
Baseline
Mean
Total
expenditure
Baseline
Mean
Total
expenditure
Baseline
Mean
SCTP*d2014 9480.703** 46,207.21 7092.684 38,001.44 13,290.677** 56,296.15
[2.19] [1.37] [2.08]
FISP*d2014 −1592.202 50,496.03 −7879.535 45,677.74 6388.564 55,867.32
[−0.48] [−1.62] [1.08]
Joint impact SCT&FISP 10,696.760** 51,667.82 12,625.724* 40,800.66 10,656.982** 64,295.13
[2.04] [1.79] [2.05]
Incremental impact of FISP
on SCTP
1216.058 5533.04 −2633.695
[0.32] [1.33] [−0.44]
Incremental impact of SCTP
on FISP
12,288.96** 20,505.26** 4268.419
[2.24] [3.35] [0.57]
Complementarity 2808.26 13,412.58** −9022.259
[0.55] [2.26] [−1.09]
R2 0.167 0.129 0.267
Observations 3214 1806 1408
Notes: i) Exchange rate in 2013: 1 USD = 329.4768 MWK. ii) Statistical significance at the 99 per cent (***), 95
per cent (**) and 90 per ent (**) confidence levels. Robust t-statistics clustered at the community level are in
brackets. All estimations control for baseline head of household’s characteristics, household demographic com-
position and size, a vector of contemporaneous cluster level prices, a set of exogenous shocks, and district fixed
effect, and are adjusted with the GPS weighting. Confidence intervals consider heteroskedasticity robust standard
errors clustered at the community level.
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Table 3. Impact on expenditure per different items – MWK real values
Expenditure
All Labour unconstrained Labour constrained
Food per adult equivalent
SCTP*d2014 5020.689 2803.445 7984.099*
[1.34] [0.61] [1.74]
FISP*d2014 −769.569 −6198.528 5565.393
[−0.25] [−1.38] [1.08]
Joint impact SCT&FISP 5538.983 6616.156 5666.645
[1.40] [1.11] [1.26]
Incremental impact of FISP on SCTP 518.29 3812.711 −2317.454
[0.18] [1.14] [−0.41]
Incremental impact of SCTP on FISP 6308.552 12,814.68** 101.2518
[1.57] [2.62] [0.02]
Complementarity 1287.863 10,011.24* −7882.847
[0.3] [1.86] [−1.06]
R2 0.174 0.104 0.252
Health per adult equivalent
SCTP*d2014 574.702 497.461 632.908
[1.51] [1.42] [0.92]
FISP*d2014 −554.987 −417.04 −762.646
[−0.86] [−0.80] [−0.50]
Joint impact SCT&FISP 980.121* 1018.868 808.837
[2.03] [1.69] [1.34]
Incremental impact of FISP on SCTP 405.419 521.406 175.930
[0.81] [0.82] [0.21]
Incremental impact of SCTP on FISP 1535.108* 1435.907** 1571.48
[1.94] [2.04] [1.02]
Complementarity 960.406 938.446 938.58
[1.16] [1.2] [0.53]
R2 0.073 0.133 0.07
Education per adult equivalent
SCTP*d2014 210.792*** −38.447 456.396***
[2.98] [−0.28] [3.41]
FISP*d2014 −117.666* −328.706** 117.8
[−1.84] [−2.53] [0.94]
Joint impact SCT&FISP 281.521*** 142.917 426.356**
[2.84] [1.19] [2.30]
Incremental impact of FISP on SCTP 70.729 181.363 −30.039
[0.63] [1.18] [−0.54]
Incremental impact of SCTP on FISP 399.187*** 471.622*** 308.556*
[4.1] [3.5] [1.68]
Complementarity 188.395 510.069** −147.839
[1.51] [2.5] [−0.81]
R2 0.143 0.154 0.175
Clothing and foot. per adult equivalent
SCTP*d2014 1031.314*** 1033.338*** 1007.661***
[6.76] [5.05] [4.08]
FISP*d2014 167.566** 26.962 410.703**
[2.38] [0.25] [2.22]
Joint impact SCT&FISP 980.496*** 1061.451*** 880.214***
[5.95] [5.42] [3.72]
Incremental impact of FISP on SCTP −50.818 28.113 −127.447
[−0.34] [0.13] [−0.58]
Incremental impact of SCTP on FISP 812.929*** 1034.49*** 469.5115
[4.46] [5.08] [1.56]
Complementarity −218.385 1.151 −538.1498
(continued )
12 N. Pace et al.
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [1
68
.20
2.2
53
.22
5]
 at
 08
:47
 16
 O
cto
be
r 2
01
7 
including as an additional regressor the size of cultivated land at baseline. The estimates of the joint
impact of the two programmes received simultaneously show a much larger increase of the value of
production, which ranges between 70 to 86 per cent of the baseline mean value, for labour
Table 3. (Continued)
Expenditure
All Labour unconstrained Labour constrained
[−1.25] [0] [−1.85]
R2 0.126 0.157 0.133
Observations 3214 1806 1408
-2,000
0
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
10,000
12,000
SCTP FISP Sum SCTP and
FISP
Joint Effect
Figure 2. Impact on value of production – MWK real values.
Note: Exchange rate in 2013: 1 USD = 329.4768 MWK.
Table 4. Impact on value of production – MWK real values
All Labour unconstrained Labour constrained
Value of
production
Baseline
Mean
Value of
production
Baseline
Mean
Value of
production
Baseline
Mean
SCTP*d2014 1359.978 9143.033 2421.597* 10,501.45 67.177 7472.863
[0.97] [1.75] [0.03]
FISP*d2014 5079.694*** 9570.896 5954.431*** 11,169.23 2806.269 7789.116
[3.74] [5.54] [1.08]
Joint impact SCT&FISP 7702.45*** 9830.867 7798.565*** 11,101.51 7196.608*** 8354.416
[6.29] [5.87] [4.00]
Incremental impact of FISP
on SCTP
6342.471*** 5376.968*** 7129.431***
[6.93] [3.68] [3.97]
Incremental impact of
SCTP on FISP
2622.755* 1844.134 4390.339**
[1.81] [1.30] [1.99]
Complementarity 1262.777 −577.463 4323.162
[0.78] [−0.35] [1.31]
R2 0.275 0.313 0.284
Observations 3214 1806 1408
Notes: See notes i) and ii) in Table 2. These estimates include as an additional regressor the size of cultivated land
at baseline.
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unconstrained and constrained households. The results show strong synergies between the two
interventions since the incremental effect of each programme on the other is positive and statistically
significant. Moreover, the heterogeneity analysis suggests that the stand-alone impacts of SCTP and
FISP are larger for labour unconstrained households but positive synergies take place more for
households defined as labour constrained. Indeed, for labour constrained households the incremental
impact of FISP on SCTP is 7129 MWK (22 USD), significantly greater than the same incremental
impact for labour unconstrained households (5378 MWK, 16 USD), and the incremental impact of
SCTP on FISP is 4390 MWK (13 USD). This is an important result: the combination of a social
protection programme and an agricultural development intervention generates more synergies in
agricultural production for the most disadvantaged households. We envisaged two potential explana-
tions for the stronger synergies on production observed for labour constrained households. They may
use part of the additional liquidity for 1) hiring labour and/or 2) purchasing agricultural assets. While
the first potential explanation is not supported by our data (see Table C3 in Appendix C in the
Supplementary Materials),5 the second explanation is upheld by the estimates of the impact of SCTP
and FISP on an index of agricultural assets6 (see Table C4 in Appendix C in the Supplementary
Materials). Synergies in increasing agricultural assets are stronger for labour constrained households.
Table 5 shows the results for crop production (land area cultivated for each crop, percentage of
households engaged in each crop production, and quantity of crop produced). The exclusive receipt
of FISP increases the area of cultivated land for maize for labour constrained households (25%
compared to baseline mean) and increases the land cultivated for groundnut for all beneficiary
households (23 and 20% of the baseline mean value for labour unconstrained and constrained
households, respectively). The evidence of no significant impact on the size of land cultivated for
other crops suggests that FISP alone and SCTP and FISP received jointly facilitate the cultivation of
land otherwise left unused without FISP and SCTP interventions.7 Table 5 further shows that FISP
positively affects the percentage of households engaged in maize production and also the quantity
produced, especially for labour constrained households. For this group, FISP increases the percen-
tage of households engaged in maize production by 15 per cent and the quantity of maize produced
by 64 per cent compared to the baseline mean. A much larger increase is estimated for production of
groundnut (100 and 300% for labour constrained households but such large numbers are due to the
extremely low value for participation and quantity produced at baseline). Overall these results are
not surprising, since at the time of the data collection, and before the latest reforms, FISP was
mainly directed towards enhancing maize production, and only to a minor extent was it also
supposed to increase other crops’ production, for instance by providing improved seeds for legumes,
including groundnuts.
For the quantity of maize produced, the stand-alone impact of SCTP is not statistically significant
but the joint effect on participation is significant for the most disadvantaged group of households. For
the production of these crops synergies are also taking place. Indeed, the incremental impact of FISP
on SCTP on participation of labour constrained households is highly significant. The effect for labour
unconstrained household is weak probably because the overwhelming majority of households are
already engaged in farming activities (‘ceiling effect’).
As far as the impact on livestock is concerned, in Tables 6 and 7 we looked at whether SCTP and
FISP had any impact on ownership of and household expenditure for livestock (chicken and other
poultry, sheep or goats, ducks and pigs). Overall the results suggest that the stand-alone impacts of
SCTP and FISP are positive and significant, and the two programmes are complementary instruments
for investment in livestock. Indeed, SCTP directly affects expenditure for livestock providing immedi-
ate cash to beneficiary households. The positive impact of FISP on these expenditures may be due to
two reasons: FISP is likely to ease liquidity used for agricultural inputs, and the vouchers provided to
FISP-beneficiaries being partially exchanged for cash. The results by labour constraints are striking:
the incremental impact of FISP on SCTP, the incremental impact of SCTP on FISP, and the
complementarity are stronger for labour constrained households.
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Table 6. Impact on livestock expenses and sales – MWK real values
Expenses Sales
All
Labour
unconstrained
Labour
constrained All
Labour
unconstrained
Labour
constrained
SCTP*d2014 1172.647*** 1395.706*** 761.950*** −78.668 −44.992 −247.801
[5.95] [6.07] [2.83] [−0.54] [−0.18] [−1.23]
FISP*d2014 232.985*** 493.282*** 32.287 57.964 231.508 62.384
[2.96] [3.66] [0.28] [0.37] [0.76] [0.27]
Joint impact SCT&FISP 1688.574*** 1478.082*** 1997.143*** 395.800* 383.684 335.607
[5.89] [3.92] [6.19] [1.98] [1.05] [1.06]
Incremental impact of
FISP on SCTP
515.926* 82.3756 1235.193*** 474.468** 428.676 583.408
[1.82] [0.2] [4.68] [2.03] [1.08] [1.57]
Incremental impact of
SCTP on FISP
1455.59*** 984.800** 1964.855*** 337.836* 152.176 273.224
[5.04] [2.52] [5.33] [1.7] [0.5] [0.8]
Complementarity 282.941 −410.906 1202.906*** 416.505 197.167 521.024
[0.99] [−0.94] [3.83] [1.50] [0.43] [1.17]
R2 0.188 0.189 0.271 0.053 0.068 0.132
Observations 3214 1806 1408 3214 1806 1408
Notes: See notes i) and ii) in Table 2.
Table 7. Impact on livestock
% HH that own: Quantity
All
Labour
unconstrained
Labour
constrained All
Labour
unconstrained
Labour
constrained
Chicken
SCTP*d2014 0.196*** 0.150*** 0.236*** 0.931*** 0.698** 1.365***
[3.81] [2.77] [3.20] [3.03] [2.62] [3.04]
FISP*d2014 0.103*** 0.134** 0.029 0.276* 0.408 −0.067
[2.80] [2.29] [0.77] [1.96] [1.34] [−0.31]
Joint impact SCT&FISP 0.244*** 0.230*** 0.263** 1.677*** 1.511*** 1.828***
[4.31] [4.54] [2.72] [3.90] [4.19] [3.03]
Incremental impact of
FISP on SCTP
0.047** 0.080* 0.027 0.746* 0.814** 0.463
[2.32] [1.81] [0.46] [1.90] [2.68] [0.98]
Incremental impact of
SCTP on FISP
0.141** 0.095 0.234** 1.400*** 1.104** 1.894**
[2.56] [1.43] [2.13] [3.29] [2.39] [2.85]
Complementarity −0.055 −0.054 −0.002 0.469 0.406 0.529
[−1.35] [−0.71] [−0.03] [1.20] [1.06] [1.08]
R2 0.105 0.109 0.149 0.086 0.106 0.140
Goats and sheep
SCTP*d2014 0.108*** 0.114*** 0.075* 0.145 0.263* 0.03
[3.99] [2.99] [1.91] [1.36] [1.84] [0.35]
FISP*d2014 0.062* 0.099 0.025 0.145 0.294 0.021
[2.01] [1.53] [0.59] [1.30] [1.46] [0.19]
Joint impact SCT&FISP 0.238*** 0.185*** 0.300*** 0.694*** 0.758*** 0.452***
[5.79] [3.75] [5.93] [3.93] [2.99] [4.18]
Incremental impact of
FISP on SCTP
0.131*** 0.071 0.226*** 0.549** 0.495** 0.422***
[4.31] [1.44] [6.35] [2.96] [2.15] [4.87]
(continued )
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6. Conclusions and policy implications
This paper contributes to the literature on anti-poverty programme evaluation and to discussions on the
design of poverty reduction and smallholder agricultural development strategies by shedding light on
the interplay between a social protection intervention and an agricultural programme in Malawi.
Findings from this evaluation challenge important notions underlying the approach to poverty
reduction in Malawi: firstly, that poor households should not participate in more than one programme
simultaneously since this supposedly represents an inefficient use of resources; secondly, that reducing
poverty and vulnerability is the only responsibility of social programmes and that productive inter-
ventions should only target the non-poor. The analysis shows that achieving the objectives of FISP and
SCTP among poor households is best done by combining these programmes such that a poor house-
hold participates in both programmes simultaneously. When combined, there are synergies between
SCTP and FISP in increasing expenditure, the value of agricultural production and livestock.
Furthermore, the heterogeneity analysis conducted in this paper suggests that synergies between the
two programmes are mediated by household labour capacity. On the one hand, we find that the
positive synergies between SCTP and FISP in increasing household expenditures are stronger for
labour unconstrained households. On the other hand, the synergies in increasing agricultural produc-
tion are stronger for labour constrained households.
Compared to previous contributions in the literature focusing on the experience of Malawi, our
paper is closely related to Matita and Chirwa (2014) in two ways. Both papers find that SCTP is a
more powerful policy intervention for increasing expenditure while FISP is a more effective instru-
ment for increasing agricultural production. Moreover, they both find that SCTP is more effective for
labour constrained households while FISP for labour unconstrained households. However, our paper
Table 7. (Continued)
% HH that own: Quantity
All
Labour
unconstrained
Labour
constrained All
Labour
unconstrained
Labour
constrained
Incremental impact of
SCTP on FISP
0.176*** 0.086 0.276*** 0.549** 0.464* 0.431***
[3.70] [1.24] [4.48] [2.89] [1.73] [3.60]
Complementarity 0.069* −0.028 0.201*** 0.404* 0.201 0 .401**
[1.71] [−0.34] [3.44] [1.86] [0.68] [2.91]
R2 0.129 0.128 0.226 0.083 0.113 0.138
Pigeons, doves or ducks
SCTP*d2014 0.007 0.006 0.001 0.136* 0.263** −0.083
[0.48] [0.37] [0.06] [1.71] [2.33] [−0.83]
FISP*d2014 −0.005 −0.006 −0.006 0.065 0.143 −0.045
[−0.38] [−0.27] [−0.34] [1.21] [1.20] [−0.63]
Joint impact SCT&FISP 0.060** 0.064* 0.052* 0.280** 0.336** 0.238*
[2.55] [1.84] [1.71] [2.74] [2.09] [1.80]
Incremental impact of
FISP on SCTP
0.053* 0.058* 0.051 0.144 0.072 0.320*
[1.91] [1.7] [1.28] [1.15] [0.45] [1.67]
Incremental impact of
SCTP on FISP
0.064** 0.070* 0.057* 0.215** 0.192 0.283*
[2.65] [1.9] [1.7] [2.12] [1.32] [1.81]
Complementarity 0.057* 0.064 0.056 0.079 −0.071 0.365*
[1.89] [1.5] [1.31] [0.58] [−0.38] [1.73]
R2 0.039 0.044 0.080 0.024 0.031 0.071
Observations 3214 1806 1408 3214 1806 1408
Notes: See note ii) in Table 2.
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partially counteracts the results on the synergies between the two programmes with, consequently,
different policy recommendations. The simulation conducted by Matita and Chirwa (2014) using
nationally representative data suggests that FISP should target households that are moderately poor
while SCTP should continue focusing on ultra-poor households. The authors argue that the gains from
harmonisation and targeting different households may be greater than delivering these two transfers to
the same households. Their rationale is that cash transfers can broaden markets for maize produced
through FISP among the moderate poor who produce more than they need. Our study, based on
representative data on the lower income quantile of the population of two districts in Malawi, supports
a different view: the provision of both SCTP and FISP to the same poor households generates positive
synergies, and for some specific outcomes, the joint impact of the two programmes implemented
simultaneously is actually significantly greater than the sum of the stand-alone contributions. These
findings lead to important considerations related to the target population of programmes; productive
agricultural interventions such as FISP have a role to play in reducing poverty and should therefore
include ultra-poor households among their target populations, who should also continue participating
in social protection programmes such as SCTP.
This raises the question of whether the joint implementation of the two programmes on the same
group of households is a cost-effective way to reach the stated goals of SCTP and FISP. In order to
provide support to our view, we conducted a ‘back of envelop’ calculation of the direct benefit-cost
ratio of the joint implementation of the programmes. For this exercise, we compared the direct
benefits of the joint implementation of the programmes and the cost associated wiyh them. The
direct benefits are obtained summing up the estimates of the joint impacts of the programme on
total household consumption expenditure (52,936 MWK, corresponding to 161 USD – the full
estimates for total household expenditure are reported in Table C1 in Appendix C in the
Supplementary Materials) and the value of agricultural production (7702 MWK, corresponding to
23 USD), amounting to a total benefit of 60,638 MKW (184 USD). The total costs are estimated
summing up the cost of SCTP transfers (an average of 96 USD per household), obtained from the
operational module of the questionnaire, and the cost of FISP (an average cost of 75 USD per
household), amounting to a total cost of 171 USD. The benefit-cost ratio calculated comparing the
total direct benefits and the total cost is 1.1 USD per 1 USD of combined programme cost,
meaning that the benefits derived from the joint implementation of the programmes more than
overcome the combined programmes’ cost.
To substantiate this result, in a companion paper we conducted a local economy-wide cost-benefit
analysis in which we consider not only the direct benefits on the beneficiaries but also the local
economy-wide benefits of the project, including spillovers to non-beneficiaries (for details, see,
2017).8 Income spillovers to non-beneficiaries are simulated with the use of a Local Economy Wide
Impact Evaluation (LEWIE) model. We compare the local-economy benefits, appropriately dis-
counted, to the cost of the programmes under three different scenarios (for details, see, 2017):
(A) Combined implementation of the status quo SCTP and FISP. This scenario envisages a partial
overlapping of SCTP and FISP in ultra-poor and labour constrained households;
(B) Reallocation of resources with non-overlapping targeting, that is SCTP allocated to all ultra-poor
households and FISP allocated to non-poor and moderately poor households.
(C) Reallocation of resources with partial overlapping of SCTP and FISP in moderately poor labour
constrained households.
The main result of this analysis is that in combination with SCTP, FISP raises the benefit-cost
ratio of the SCTP alone. Indeed, in a general equilibrium framework, rising consumption costs due
to an increase in demand, and a consequent upward effect on prices, limit the real income benefits
from the SCTP alone, but FISP increases the local food supply and lowers food prices. Our
analysis shows that the higher benefit-cost ratio is obtained under option A, while the lowest
benefit-cost ratio is obtained under option B, respectively 1.97 USD and 1.56 USD per 1 USD of
combined programmes’ costs.9
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To conclude, the evidence shown here suggests that simultaneously providing agricultural and social
protection intervention programmes to poor households can have positive effects in the short-term,
which are likely to support poor households in breaking out of the cycle of disadvantage in the
medium- and long-term and to prevent the transmission of poverty across generations. The SCTP
provides liquidity and certainty for poor households and small family farmers, allowing them to invest
in agriculture, and better manage risks. Meanwhile, FISP can also promote growth in the productivity
of small family farmers, by addressing structural constraints that limit access to inputs.
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Notes
1. Kilic et al. (2013) explain that the limited pro-poor targeting stems from community-based targeting (that is open forums in which
village residents identify beneficiaries in a collective fashion) that are co-opted by more influential community members. Their
analysis suggests that, on average, households that are relatively well-off, connected to community leadership, and residing in
agro-ecologically favourable locations are more likely to be FISP beneficiaries and receive more input coupons.
2. For details about the programme implementation and funding, see Asfaw et al. (2015) and Handa et al. (2015b).
3. These groups of households represent, respectively, 33.3 and 18.8 per cent of the original sample.
4. Table B1 in Appendix B (available in the Supplementary Materials) provides tests of differences between households
excluded versus households included in the analysis of this paper. The group of households excluded from the study sample
is relatively better off. This is not surprising since it includes households that received agricultural input subsidies already at
baseline or in the previous two years.
5. Table C3 in Appendix C (available in the Supplementary Materials) shows the stand-alone impact of SCTP and FISP, as well
as their joint impact and complementarities on a set of indicators of labour supply (total number of days in farming activities,
total number of days in ganyu labour, total number of days in wage labour) and hired labour (days of workers hired, total and
by sex). The results show a clear negative and significant impact of the SCTP on hours spent in casual labour (Ganyu labour),
especially for labour of unconstrained households. No effect is detected on the number of days in farming activities, number
of hours in wage labour and number of days of hired labour.
6. This index is generated through a principal component analysis which includes the following items: hand hoes, axes, panga
knifes, sickles, watering cans.
7. To support this view, we regress the total land cultivated for any kind of crop over the same set of regressors included in all
the estimates. The results (not included in the paper but available upon request) show that FISP alone and especially FISP
combined with SCTP increase the size of total land cultivated. Moreover, the incremental impact of FISP on SCTP is positive
and significant for labour constrained households.
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8. (2017) investigates both the local-economy wide impact evaluation of several stand-alone programmes (SCTP, FISP, public
works programme, extension services and irrigation projects) and their combinations, and the CBA. Here we refer only to the
section on the CBA.
9. The benefit-cost ratio for Option B is 1.56 USD per 1 USD of combined programmes’ costs.
References
Andersson, C., Mekonnen, A., & Stage, J. (2011). Impacts of the productive safety net program in Ethiopia on livestock and tree
holdings of rural households. Journal of Development Economics. 94, 119–126. doi:10.1016/j.jdeveco.2009.12.002
Arndt, C., Pauw, K., & Thurlow, J. (2016). The economy-wide impacts and risks of Malawi’s Farm Input Subsidy Programme.
American Journal of Agricultural Economics. 98, 962–980. doi:10.1093/ajae/aav048
Asfaw, S., Davis, B., Dewbre, J., Handa, S., & Winters, P. (2014). Cash transfer programme, productive activities and labour
supply: Evidence from a randomised experiment in Kenya. The Journal of Development Studies. 50, 1172–1196.
doi:10.1080/00220388.2014.919383
Asfaw, S., Pickmans, P., & Davis, B. (2015). Productive Impact of Malawi’s Social Cash Transfer Programme – Midline
Report. A From Protection to Production (PtoP) report. Rome: Food and Agricultural Organization of the United
Nations (FAO).
FAO. (2016). B. Davis, S. Handa, N. Hypher, N. Winder-Rossi, P. Winters, & J. Yablonski (Eds.), From evidence to action: The
story of cash transfers and impact evaluation in Sub-Saharan Africa. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Beegle, K., Galasso, E., & Goldberg, J. (2017). Direct and indirect effects of Malawi’s public works program on food security.
Journal of Development Economics. 128, 1–23. doi:10.1016/j.jdeveco.2017.04.004
Boone, R., Covarrubias, K., Davis, B., & Winters, P. (2013). Cash transfer programs and agricultural production: The case of
Malawi. Agricultural Economics. 44, 365–378. doi:10.1111/agec.12017
Carter, M., Laajaj, R., & Yang, D. (2014). Subsidies and the persistence of technology adoption: Field experimental evidence
from Mozambique (NBER Working Paper, 20465). doi: 10.3386/w20465
Carter, M., Laajaj, R., & Yang, D. (2015). Savings and subsidies, separately and together: Decomposing effects of a bundled
anti-poverty programme. Unpublished manuscript.
Chirwa, E., & Dorward, A. (2013). Agricultural input subsidy: The recent Malawi experience. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Chirwa, E., Matita, M., & Dorward, A. (2011). Factors influencing access to agricultural input subsidy coupons in Malawi.
Working Paper No. 027. Futures Agricultures.
Covarrubias, K., Davis, B., & Winters, P. (2012). From protection to production: Productive impacts of the Malawi Social Cash
Transfer scheme. Journal of Development Effectiveness. 4, 50–77. doi:10.1080/19439342.2011.641995
Daidone, S., Davis, B., Dewbre, J., Miguelez, B., Niang, O., & Pellerano, L. (2017). Linking agriculture and social protection for
food security: The case of Lesotho. Global Food Security. 12, 146–154. doi:10.1016/j.gfs.2016.12.002
Devereux, S., Marshall, J., MacAskill, J., & Pelham, L. (2005). Making cash count: Lessons from cash transfer schemes in East
and Southern Africa for supporting the most vulnerable children and households. London: Save the Children UK, HelpAge
International and Institute of Development Studies.
Dorward, A., & Chirwa, E. (2011). The Malawi agricultural input subsidy programme: 2005/06 to 2008/09. International
Journal of Agricultural Sustainability. 9, 232–247. doi:10.3763/ijas.2010.0567
Dorward, A., Chirwa, E., Matita, M., Mhango, W., Zvula, T. E., & Thome, K. (2013). Evaluation of the 2012/2013 Farm Input
Subsidy Programme. Malawi: Final Report Undertaken for the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security.
Duflo, E., Kremer, M., & Robinson, J. (2011). Nudging farmers to use fertilizer: Theory and experimental evidence from Kenya.
American Economic Review. 101, 2350–2390. doi:10.1257/aer.101.6.2350
Ellis, F., & Maliro, D. (2013). Fertiliser subsidies and social cash transfers as complementary or competing instruments for
reducing vulnerability to hunger: The case of Malawi. Development Policy Review. 31, 575–596. doi:10.1111/dpr.12026
FAO. (2015). The State of Food and Agriculture. Social Protection and Agriculture: Breaking the cycle of rural poverty. Rome:
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.
Gertler, P. J., Martinez, S., Premand, P., Rawlings, L. B., & Vermeersch, C. M. J. (2011). Impact evaluation in practice (2nd ed.)
Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank and World Bank.
Handa, S., Angeles, G., Abdoulayi, A., Mvula, P., & Tsoka, M. (2015b). Malawi social cash transfer programme midline impact
evaluation report. Chapel Hill: University of North Caroline.
Handa, S., Park, M., Darko, R., Osei-Akoto, I., Davis, B., & Daidone, S. (2013). Livelihood empowerment against poverty
impact evaluation. Chapel Hill, NC: Carolina Population Center, University of North Carolina.
Handa, S., Seidenfeld, D., Davis, B., & Tembo, G. (2015a). The social and productive impacts of Zambia’s child grant. Journal
of Policy Analysis and Management. 35, 357–387. doi:10.1002/pam.21892
Hjelm, L. (2016). The impact of cash transfers on food security. Innocenti Research Briefs no. 2016-04. Florence: UNICEF
Office of Research - Innocenti.
Imbens, G. W. (2000). The role of the propensity score in estimating dose–response functions. Biometrika. 87, 706–710.
doi:10.1093/biomet/87.3.706
Independent Evaluation Group. (2011). Evidence and lessons learned from impact evaluations on social safety nets. Washington,
DC: The World Bank.
22 N. Pace et al.
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [1
68
.20
2.2
53
.22
5]
 at
 08
:47
 16
 O
cto
be
r 2
01
7 
Jayne, T., & Rashid, S. (2013). Input subsidy programs in sub-Saharan Africa: A synthesis of recent evidence. Agricultural
Economics. 44, 547–562. doi:10.1111/agec.12073
Jayne, T., & Ricker-Gilbert, J. (2011). What are the enduring effects of fertilizer subsidy programmes on recipient farm
households? Evidence from Malawi (Staff Paper Series 09). East Lansing, MI: Department of Agricultural, Food, and
Resource Economics, Michigan State University.
Kilic, T., Whitney, E., & Winters, P. (2013). Decentralized beneficiary targeting in large-scale development programmes:
Insights from the Malawi Farm Input Subsidy Programme (Policy Research Working Paper 6713). Washington, DC: The
World Bank.
Marenya, P., & Barrett, C. (2009). State-conditional fertilizer yield response on western Kenyan farms. American Journal of
Agricultural Economics. 91, 991–1006. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8276.2009.01313.x
Mason, N., & Jayne, T. (2013). Fertiliser subsidies and smallholder commercial fertiliser purchases: Crowding out, leakage and
policy implications for Zambia. Journal of Agricultural Economics. 64, 558–582. doi:10.1111/1477-9552.12025
Matita, M., & Chirwa, E. (2014). Targeting in Social Cash Transfer and Farm Input Subsidy programmes in Malawi: should
they be harmonized? Document undertaken for the Ministry of Agriculture Irrigation and Water Development, Funded by
DFID. London: School of Oriental & African Studies - University of London.
Miller, C., Tsoka, M., & Reichert, K. (2010). Impacts on children of cash transfers in Malawi. In S. Handa, S. Devereux, & D.
Webb (Eds.), Social protection for Africa’s children. London: Routledge Press.
OPM. (2013a). Qualitative research and analyses of the economic impact of cash transfer programmes in sub-Saharan Africa.
Ghana Country Case Study Report.Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO).
OPM. (2013b). Qualitative research and analyses of the economic impact of cash transfer programmes in sub-Saharan Africa.
Kenya Country Case Study Report. Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO)
Pauw, K., Beck, U., & Mussa, R. (2014). Did rapid smallholder-led agricultural growth fail to reduce rural poverty?: Making
sense of Malawi’s poverty puzzle. WIDER Working Paper 2014/123. Helsinki: UNU-WIDER.
Ricker-Gilbert, J., & Jayne, T. S. (2012, 18–24 August). Do fertilizer subsidies boost staple crop production and reduce poverty
across the distribution of smallholders in Africa? Quantile regression results from Malawi. Selected Paper for the Triennial
Meeting of the International Association of Agricultural Economists, Foz Do Iguacu, Brazil.
Ricker-Gilbert, J., Jayne, T. S., & Chirwa, E. (2011). Subsidies and crowding out: A double-hurdle model of fertilizer demand in
Malawi. American Journal of Agricultural Economics. 93, 26–42. doi:10.1093/ajae/aaq122
Rubin, D. B. (1974). Estimating causal effects of treatments in randomized and non- randomized studies. Journal of Educational
Psychology, 66, 688–701. doi:10.1037/h0037350
Sachs, J. (2012, April 19). How Malawi fed its own people. New York Times Op-Ed piece.
Saweda, L., Liverpool-Tasie, L. S., & Takeshima, H. (2013). Input promotion within a complex subsector: Fertilizer in Nigeria.
Agricultural Economics. 44, 581–594. doi:10.1111/agec.12075
Thome, K., Taylor, E., & Filipski, M. (2014). The local economy impacts of FISP. (Working Paper on the Evaluation of the 2013/
2014 Farm Input Subsidy Programme). Malawi, Mimeo.
Tirivayi, N., Knowles, M., & Davis, B. (2016). The interaction between social protection and agriculture: A review of evidence.
Global Food Security. 10, 52–62. doi:10.1016/j.gfs.2016.08.004
Tittonell, P., & Giller, K. (2013). When yield gaps are poverty traps: The paradigm of ecological intensification in African
smallholder agriculture. Field Crops Research. 143, 76–90. doi:10.1016/j.fcr.2012.10.007
Tiwari, S., Daidone, S., Ruvalcaba, M. A., Prifti, E., Handa, S., Davis, B., . . . Seidenfeld, D. (2016). Impact of cash transfer
programs on food security and nutrition in sub-Saharan Africa: A cross-country analysis. Global Food Security. 11, 72–83.
doi:10.1016/j.gfs.2016.07.009
Uysal, S. D. (2015). Doubly Robust estimation of causal effects with multivalued treatments: An application to the returns to
schooling. Journal of Applied Econometrics. 30, 763–786. doi:10.1002/jae.2386
Veras Soares, F., Knowles, M., Daidone, S., & Tirivayi, N. (2017). Combined effects and synergies between agricultural and
social protection interventions: What is the evidence so far? Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United
Nations (FAO).
Wooldridge, J. M. (2007). Inverse probability weighted estimation for general missing data problems. Journal of Econometrics,
141, 1281–1301. doi:10.1016/j.jeconom.2007.02.002
World Bank. (2008). World Development Report 2008: Agriculture For Development. Washington, DC: Author.
Evaluating synergies of development programmes 23
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [1
68
.20
2.2
53
.22
5]
 at
 08
:47
 16
 O
cto
be
r 2
01
7 
Appendix A
1 A.1 Impacts of fertiliser subsidies programmes in sub-Saharan Africa
Input subsidy programmes are one of the most debated policy interventions in Africa (Jayne & Rashid, 2013).
The literature on the impacts of input subsidy programmes in sub-Saharan Africa finds mixed results (among
others, see Arndt et al. 2016; Dorward & Chirwa, 2011; Jayne & Rashid, 2013; Sachs, 2012; World Bank,
2008). Given the focus of the current paper we only review previous contributions related to two key points,
that is the impact of input subsidy programmes on total fertiliser use, and agricultural growth and poverty
reduction.
As far as the impact of input subsidy programmes on total fertiliser use is concerned, empirical evidence
suggests that the receipt of subsidised fertiliser induces some farmers to buy less fertiliser from commercial
retailers than they otherwise would have done in the absence of the subsidy programme. This ‘crowding out’ of
commercial fertiliser tends to be less when subsidy programmes are targeted to relatively poor farmers and in
areas where the commercial demand for fertiliser is low (Mason & Jayne, 2013; Ricker-Gilbert, Jayne, & Chirwa,
2011). Meanwhile, Saweda, Liverpool-Tasie, and Takeshima (2013) found evidence of ‘crowding in’ of com-
mercial fertiliser demand in a pilot subsidy scheme in one district of Nigeria where fertiliser vouchers were mainly
targeted to areas where private commercial markets were relatively weak and to households that were relatively
poor. Results from randomised control trials (RCTs) on the impact of input subsidy programmes have found
mixed evidence on their effectiveness at raising fertiliser utilization (Duflo, Kremer, & Robinson, 2011; Carter
et al., 2014).
As far as poverty reduction is concerned, the review of the micro-level evidence by Jayne and Rashid (2013)
shows that the input subsidy programmes have raised national food production. Arndt et al. (2015) study the
economy-wide impact of FISP in Malawi adopting a computable general equilibrium model. Their approach,
which also accounts for indirect benefits, yields benefit-cost ratios about 60 per cent higher than existing partial
equilibrium studies. However, the effects of these kinds of programmes are highly asymmetric across the
distributions of farm size and wealth. This is mainly due to the fact that poor households tended to receive
proportionately less of the subsidy than wealthier farmers (Jayne & Ricker-Gilbert, 2011; Marenya & Barrett,
2009; Ricker-Gilbert & Jayne, 2012; Tittonell & Giller, 2013). Rural headcount poverty rates in Zambia have
consistently floated around 80 per cent throughout the 10-year period of the implementation of the farm input
support programme (Mason & Jayne, 2013). However, results from a RCT in Mozambique (Carter, Laajaj, &
Yang, 2014) show that the input subsidies programme had a positive and statistically significant effect on several
poverty indicators, such as household consumption asset holdings and housing improvements. Pauw, Beck, and
Mussa (2014) re-estimate poverty incidence from the 2010/11 Integrated Household Survey dataset and find an
8.2 percentage point decrease in national poverty from 2004/5 to 2010/11.
2 A.2 Impacts of social cash transfers programmes in sub-Saharan Africa
There is evidence from numerous countries that cash transfers generally affect total household consumption and
food security worldwide. Evidence on the impacts of cash transfer programmes in seven countries (Ethiopia,
Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe) in sub-Saharan Africa shows that overall these
programmes improved food consumption (FAO, 2016). In Kenya, the Cash Transfer for Orphan and Vulnerable
Children programme (CT-OVC) significantly increased food consumption coming from home production (Asfaw,
Davis, Dewbre, Handa, & Winters, 2014). In Zambia the Child Grant (CG) model of the Social Cash Transfer
increased expenditure, with the majority of the increases going to food, health and hygiene, clothing and
transportation (Handa, Seidenfeld, Davis, & Tembo, 2015a). A large body of evidence shows that food security
and child nutrition improved as a result of these interventions (FAO, 2015; Hjelm, 2016; Tiwari et al., 2016). A
meta-review identified 17 out of 20 studies that reported an increase in food intake, diversity and quality, all
factors that contribute to food security (Independent Evaluation Group, 2011). Qualitative findings on the LEAP
programme in Ghana and CT-OVC in Kenya showed improvements in the quantity and diversity of food produced
(OPM, 2013a, 2013b). Contrary to previous empirical findings, Beegle et al. (2017) find no evidence that the
Social Action Fund in Malawi improved food security and, in addition, document some negative spillover to
untreated households.
As far as the effects of social cash transfers on production activities are concerned, the majority of the
available evidence from sub-Saharan Africa shows that social protection encourages investments and the accu-
mulation of agricultural assets, but to varying degrees and depending on several factors, such as the availability of
labour given the demographic profile of beneficiary households, the relative distribution of productive assets, the
local economic context, the relevance of messaging and soft conditions for social spending, the regularity and
predictability of the transfers themselves and finally, the level of transfer as a share of per capita income (Tirivayi,
Knowles, & Davis, 2016). Andersson, Mekonnen, and Stage (2011) found that the Productive Safety Net
Programme in Ethiopia increased the number of trees planted by beneficiaries. In Zambia, the CG programme
24 N. Pace et al.
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [1
68
.20
2.2
53
.22
5]
 at
 08
:47
 16
 O
cto
be
r 2
01
7 
increased the share of households planting maize, groundnuts and rice, and increased crop input expenditures and
the value of crop production, but did not have a significant impact on the quantity harvested (Handa et al., 2015a).
In Ghana and Kenya, qualitative assessments suggested that unconditional cash transfers modestly increased farm
production, but only for economically active beneficiaries (OPM, 2013a, 2013b).
As for the effects of cash transfer programmes on farm implements and livestock ownership, the CG in
Zambia and the SCT in Malawi had positive and significant effects (Boone, Covarrubias, Davis, & Winters, 2013;
Covarrubias et al., 2012; Handa et al., 2015a). As with the programmes in Zambia and Malawi, the Kenya CT-
OVC programme led to a modest increase in the ownership of sheep and goats (Asfaw et al., 2014), while the
Ghana LEAP programme had no impact on agricultural assets or livestock (Handa et al., 2013). Qualitative
assessments show that unconditional cash transfers in Ghana (LEAP) and Kenya (CT-OVC) stimulated asset
acquisitions for economically active beneficiaries or those with relatively higher asset endowments only, leaving
behind the elderly, infirm and poorest households (OPM, 2013a, 2013b). In other research, qualitative assessments
of cash transfer programmes in Zambia and Lesotho showed that they increased livestock ownership (Devereux,
Marshall, MacAskill, & Pelham, 2005).
Appendix B
Table B1. Anova test for difference between groups included in the analysis and groups excluded
Excluded Included F-test P-value
single head of hh 0.665 0.750 28.78 0.0000
female head of hh 0.827 0.854 4.51 0.034
age of head of hh 60.021 55.583 43.230 0.000
# members in the hh 4.543 4.528 0.03 0.857
# members in the hh: 0–5 years old 0.600 0.747 22.23 0.000
# members in the hh: 6–12 years old 1.153 1.218 3.06 0.080
# members in the hh: 13–17 years old 0.948 0.898 2.28 0.131
# members in the hh: 18–64 years old 1.193 1.126 3.56 0.059
# members in the hh: > = 65 years old 0.649 0.538 24.72 0.000
# orphans in the hh 0.864 1.014 8.37 0.004
yrs of education head of hh 0.994 1.157 4.89 0.027
hh severely labour constrained 0.472 0.471 0.01 0.926
hh consumption – total 189,278.36 158,798.51 55.62 0.000
hh consumption – food and beverages 147,563.4 123,544.54 55.21 0.000
Household owns or cultivates land 0.991 0.919 112.79 0.000
Total plot area operated within hh 1.454 1.177 65.41 0.000
HH has plot that is irrigated 0.046 0.051 0.37 0.543
HH applies chemical fertiliser 0.947 0.323 2546.7 0.000
HH applies organic fertiliser 0.226 0.267 7.37 0.007
HH uses pesticides 0.026 0.019 1.65 0.199
HH uses improved or hybrid seed 0.511 0.269 217.16 0.000
HH planted maize 0.979 0.869 158.97 0.000
HH planted groundnut 0.236 0.122 74.26 0.000
HH planted pigeonpea 0.264 0.136 85.55 0.000
Value of production 16,412.26 10,009.78 371.21 0.000
HH owns hand hoe 0.922 0.814 89.57 0.000
HH owns axe 0.166 0.103 28.98 0.000
HH owns panga knife 0.258 0.203 14.14 0.000
HH owns sickle 0.218 0.145 29.39 0.000
HH owns chickens now 0.189 0.120 30.74 0.000
HH owns goat or a sheep now 0.131 0.067 37.93 0.000
Total HH Expenditure for livestock 82.11 65.63 1.23 0.268
Total HH livestock sales 494.32 246.00 16.48 0.000
obs 1756 1607
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Table B2. Anova test for difference between groups of intervention: control, SCTP, FISP, SCTP&FISP
(unadjusted)
C SCT FISP SCT&FISP F-test P-value
single head of hh 0.760 0.749 0.748 0.730 0.32 0.8097
female head of hh 0.870 0.839 0.857 0.846 0.76 0.514
age of head of hh 53.160 54.294 58.477 60.199 9.93 0.000
# members in the hh 4.620 4.487 4.565 4.391 0.74 0.525
# members in the hh: 0–5 years old 0.822 0.798 0.596 0.636 5.13 0.002
# members in the hh: 6–12 years old 1.568 1.418 1.619 1.439 2.27 0.079
# members in the hh: 13–17 years old 0.581 0.624 0.658 0.612 0.61 0.608
# members in the hh: 18–64 years old 1.164 1.115 1.049 0.971 2.83 0.057
# members in the hh: > = 65 years old 0.485 0.533 0.643 0.733 12.22 0.000
# orphans in the hh 1.030 1.026 0.955 1.009 0.14 0.937
yrs of education head of hh 1.149 1.246 1.273 0.925 1.57 0.195
hh severely labour constrained 0.438 0.461 0.534 0.500 2.51 0.057
hh consumption – total 157,874.37 150,568.07 171,136.32 164,813.29 1.41 0.238
hh consumption – food and beverages 122,879.61 117,390.78 130,279.30 130,018.45 1.89 0.129
Household owns or cultivates land 0.916 0.910 0.933 0.927 0.47 0.702
Total plot area operated within hh 1.199 1.080 1.276 1.220 2.89 0.034
HH has plot that is irrigated 0.049 0.047 0.047 0.063 0.41 0.747
HH applies chemical fertiliser 0.279 0.278 0.370 0.448 11.2 0.000
HH applies organic fertiliser 0.274 0.222 0.279 0.319 3.22 0.022
HH uses pesticides 0.013 0.021 0.020 0.027 0.8 0.494
HH uses improved or hybrid seed 0.279 0.232 0.271 0.311 2.15 0.092
HH planted maize 0.873 0.863 0.850 0.890 0.69 0.559
HH planted groundnut 0.100 0.111 0.118 0.187 4.92 0.002
HH planted pigeonpea 0.131 0.139 0.115 0.157 0.72 0.541
Value of production 9906.08 9154.94 10,737.91 11,100.21 2.98 0.030
HH owns hand hoe 0.818 0.778 0.814 0.870 7.97 0.000
HH owns axe 0.096 0.079 0.106 0.152 13.01 0.000
HH owns panga knife 0.192 0.201 0.195 0.235 4.28 0.005
HH owns sickle 0.156 0.125 0.110 0.189 10.7 0.000
HH owns chickens now 0.133 0.117 0.115 0.102 7.85 0.000
HH owns goat or a sheep now 0.074 0.046 0.069 0.090 22.19 0.000
Total HH Expenditure for livestock 90.12 49.37 43.69 63.720 47.69 0.000
Total HH livestock sales 266.64 238.49 170.20 280.338 1.43 0.231
obs 616 485 239 267
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Appendix C
Table C1. Impact on total household expenditure – MWK real values
Total Household Expenditure
All Labour unconstrained Labour constrained
SCTP*d2014 44,623.964*** 41,418.421* 43,166.987**
[2.77] [1.76] [2.65]
FISP*d2014 2878.824 −19,300 23,605.980*
[0.27] [−0.98] [2.00]
Joint impact SCT&FISP 52,935.514*** 64,080.442** 35,685.601***
[3.15] [2.35] [3.53]
Incremental impact of FISP on SCTP 8311.55 22,662.02 −7481.386
[0.83] [1.27] [−0.58]
Incremental Impact of SCTP on FISP 50,056.69*** 83,379.57 12,079.62
[2.97] [3.72] [0.74]
Complementarity 5432.726 41,961.15 −31,087.37
[0.38] [1.65] [−1.84]
R2 0.167 0.126 0.299
Observations 3214 1806 1408
i) Exchange rate in 2013: 1 USD = 329.4768 MWK; ii) Statistical significance at the 99% (***), 95 (**) and 90%
(**) confidence levels. Robust t-statistics clustered at the community level are in brackets. All estimations control
for baseline head of household’s characteristics, household demographic composition and size, a vector of
contemporaneous cluster level prices, a set of exogenous shocks, and district fixed effect, and are adjusted with
the GPS weighting. Confidence intervals consider heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered at the
community level.
Table C2. Impact on expenditure per different items – MWK real values
Expenditure
All Labour unconstrained Labour constrained
Alc/Tobacco per adult equivalent
SCTP*d2014 987.797* 1112.395* 1327.851
[1.79] [1.88] [1.52]
FISP*d2014 −673.115 −1582.963 457.356
[−1.64] [−1.59] [1.17]
Joint impact SCT&FISP 1473.096 1535.615* 1516.072
[1.65] [1.88] [1.58]
Incremental impact of FISP on SCTP 485.2985 423.2209 188.2207
[0.5] [0.72] [0.16]
Incremental impact of SCTP on FISP 2146.211* 3118.578** 1058.716
[1.89] [2.04] [1.25]
Complementarity 1158.414 2006.184* −269.1354
[1.08] [1.78] [−0.21]
R2 0.053 0.105 0.034
Housing/Utilities per adult equivalent
SCTP*d2014 12.597 184.878 −30.858
[0.04] [0.88] [−0.06]
FISP*d2014 −254.981 48.921 −367.327
[−0.96] [0.27] [−0.63]
Joint impact SCT&FISP 93.181 516.612 50.284
[0.24] [1.34] [0.10]
Incremental impact of FISP on SCTP 80.58 331.73 81.141
(continued )
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Table C2. (Continued)
Expenditure
All Labour unconstrained Labour constrained
[0.21] [1.09] [0.13]
Incremental impact of SCTP on FISP 348.16 467.69 417.611
[0.73] [1.21] [0.66]
Complementarity 335.56 282.81 448.469
[0.72] [0.82] [0.56]
R2 0.343 0.243 0.374
Furnishings per adult equivalent
SCTP*d2014 709.939*** 515.628*** 1100.835***
[4.12] [2.98] [3.63]
FISP*d2014 −58.206 −135.093 235.936
[−0.36] [−0.86] [1.11]
Joint impact SCT&FISP 613.099*** 793.352*** 628.545**
[4.23] [3.78] [2.61]
Incremental impact of FISP on SCTP −96.84 277.72 −472.29
[−0.87] [1.11] [−1.66]
Incremental impact of SCTP on FISP 671.305*** 928.445*** 392.609
[3.54] [3.8] [1.51]
Complementarity −38.63 412.82 −708.226**
[−0.19] [1.44] [−2.11]
R2 0.12 0.14 0.151
Transport per adult equivalent
SCTP*d2014 488.101* 524.768 457.832**
[2.01] [1.17] [2.26]
FISP*d2014 401.036 761.666 73.495
[1.42] [1.34] [0.29]
Joint impact SCT&FISP 308.51 491.928 93.015
[1.12] [1.16] [0.40]
Incremental impact of FISP on SCTP −179.59 −32.84 −364.82
[−0.64] [−0.06] [−1.58]
Incremental impact of SCTP on FISP −92.53 −269.74 19.52
[−0.39] [−0.65] [0.07]
Complementarity −580.63 −794.51 −438.31
[−1.38] [−0.98] [−1.19]
R2 0.062 0.078 0.077
Communication per adult equivalent
SCTP*d2014 51.886* 89.588 34.355
[1.74] [1.70] [0.90]
FISP*d2014 10.76 23.147 15.26
[0.39] [0.37] [0.37]
Joint impact SCT&FISP 44.465 86.249* −0.725
[1.37] [1.70] [−0.01]
Incremental impact of FISP on SCTP −7.42 −3.34 −35.08
[−0.18] [−0.08] [−0.72]
Incremental impact of SCTP on FISP 33.70 63.10 −15.99
[0.96] [1.33] [−0.27]
Complementarity −18.18 −26.49 −50.34
[−0.35] [−0.35] [−0.79]
R2 0.048 0.059 0.102
Recreation per adult equivalent
SCTP*d2014 −1.905 0.816 −3.394
[−0.73] [0.13] [−1.15]
FISP*d2014 −4.796 −10.649 0.87
[−1.20] [−1.46] [0.35]
Joint impact SCT&FISP −13.885 −15.92 −10.266
[−1.68] [−1.39] [−1.35]
(continued )
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Table C2. (Continued)
Expenditure
All Labour unconstrained Labour constrained
Incremental impact of FISP on SCTP −11.98 −16.735 −6.87
[−1.37] [−1.04] [−1.24]
Incremental impact of SCTP on FISP −9.09 −5.27 −11.14
[−0.98] [−0.42] [−1.26]
Complementarity −7.18 −6.09 −7.74
[−0.73] [−0.37] [−1.11]
R2 0.035 0.038 0.194
Hotels and restaurants per adult equivalent
SCTP*d2014 227.922 199.206 220.684
[1.66] [1.67] [0.99]
FISP*d2014 203.188* −6.369 463.293*
[1.78] [−0.06] [1.75]
Joint impact SCT&FISP 54.384 22.225 152.984
[0.26] [0.13] [0.43]
Incremental impact of FISP on SCTP −173.54 −176.98 −67.70
[−0.78] [−0.95] [−0.18]
Incremental impact of SCTP on FISP −148.803 28.59 −310.31
[−0.65] [0.16] [−0.8]
Complementarity −376.725 −170.61 −530.99
[−1.4] [−0.78] [−1.14]
R2 0.041 0.06 0.05
Miscellaneous per adult equivalent
SCTP*d2014 166.868 169.608 102.308
[1.58] [1.21] [0.83]
FISP*d2014 58.567 −60.884 178.43
[0.56] [−0.42] [1.27]
Joint impact SCT&FISP 342.789*** 356.269** 445.020**
[2.90] [2.14] [2.75]
Incremental impact of FISP on SCTP 175.921** 186.66 342.711**
[1.99] [1.02] [2.2]
Incremental impact of SCTP on FISP 284.221** 417.153* 266.59*
[2.45] [1.94] [1.64]
Complementarity 117.35 247.55 164.281
[0.86] [1.05] [0.77]
R2 0.099 0.134 0.134
Observations 3214 1806 1408
See Notes i) and ii) in Table C1.
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Appendix D
3 D.1 Kernel densities of household expenditure and value of production by treatment groups
We present four figures related to two main indicators of the demand side and the production side that are likely to
be affected by SCTP and FISP, namely total household expenditure and total value of agricultural production, by
treatment group. Figures D1 and D2 show kernel densities of total household consumption at baseline and follow-
up, respectively. While at baseline there are no significant differences among the distributions, at follow up the
distributions of expenditure for SCTP and for SCTP&FISP groups, almost coincidentally, shifted significantly to
the right. This suggests that, without controlling for potential confounding factors, SCTP contributes to an
increase in household expenditure. We replicate the same kind of exercise for the value of production. Figures D3
and D4 show kernel densities of the value of production at baseline and follow-up, respectively. As for household
expenditure, there are no significant differences among the distributions at baseline. However, at follow-up, the
distributions of value of production (maize, groundnuts, pigeon pea, nkhwani, rice, cotton, sorghum) for FISP and
especially SCTP&FISP groups significantly shifted to the right, meaning that the combination of FISP and SCTP
increases the value of production. In contrast to the case of total expenditure, here the effect seems to be driven
mainly by the implementation of FISP.
Table C4. Impact on agricultural assets index
All Labour unconstrained Labour constrained
Index of Agricultural assets
SCTP*d2014 0.029*** 0.043*** 0.007
[3.58] [4.07] [0.58]
FISP*d2014 0.023*** 0.036*** 0.003
[2.85] [3.00] [0.27]
Joint impact SCT&FISP 0.042*** 0.050*** 0.026**
[5.18] [4.09] [2.17]
Incremental impact of FISP on SCTP 0.014* 0.007 0.019*
[1.79] [0.68] [1.73]
Incremental impact of SCTP on FISP 0.020** 0.014 0.029**
[2.21] [1.08] [1.97]
Complementarity −0.009 −0.029* 0.022
[−0.80] [−1.79] [1.18]
R2 0.1881 0.1708 0.2480
Observations 3214 1806 1408
Notes: See Note ii) in Table C1.
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Figure D1. Kernel density of total household expenditure at baseline by treatment groups – real values in log.
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Figure D2. Kernel density of total household expenditure at follow up by treatment groups – real values in log.
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4 D.2 Impact on food security
We consider several proxies of food security (see Table D2). First, we analyze a question included in the survey
that asks respondents whether they worry that the household will not have enough food. Second, we consider the
number of meals consumed per day in the household. Interestingly, while the stand-alone impact of SCTP on food
security is positive and significant (nine percentage points reduction in the probability of being worried about food
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Figure D3. Kernel density of value of production at baseline by treatment groups – real values in log.
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Figure D4. Kernel density of value of production at follow up by treatment groups – real values in log.
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availability), the stand-alone impact of FISP is statistically significant for the first indicator and for labour
unconstrained households only. This is probably due to the nature of the indicator: The probability of being
worried about food availability in the future reflects more a long-term food security status rather than a present
condition. Households benefitting only from FISP (and with the labour capacity to fully exploit the subsidies) are
therefore likely to improve their food security in the future after harvesting. SCTP households instead can benefit
immediately from the available cash to increase the number of meals they consume daily (impact of 0.23 meals
per day).
Finally, as a proxy of food security we consider also daily caloric intake per adult equivalent calculated using
kilocalories per gram of edible portions of specific foods, multiplied by the quantity (in grams) of specific foods
eaten. These kilo-calorie figures are summed up within the household, and then divided by the days per week and
adjusted by demographic composition to receive daily figures per adult equivalent. We find that SCTP increases
caloric intake from purchased food for labour constrained households, a 75 per cent increase with respect to the
409 baseline caloric intake from purchased food. The stand-alone contribution of FISP is not significant. Overall,
the estimates of the joint impact suggest that the two interventions improved food security, but positive synergies
seem to take place only for the number of meals per day and only for households defined as labour unconstrained.
Table D2. Impact of food security
All Labour unconstrained Labour constrained
Worry about lack of food
SCTP*d2014 −0.091** −0.095** −0.084
[−2.17] [−2.12] [−1.57]
FISP*d2014 −0.046 −0.070** 0.002
[−1.51] [−2.28] [0.04]
Joint impact SCT&FISP −0.076 −0.109* −0.043
[−1.68] [−1.72] [−0.76]
Incremental impact of FISP on SCTP 0.015 −0.014 0.04
[0.58] [−0.29] [0.72]
Incremental impact of SCTP on FISP −0.030 −0.039 −0.045
[−0.70] [−0.62] [−0.59]
Complementarity 0.06 0.056 0.038
[1.56] [0.92] [0.44]
R2 0.0794 0.1056 0.1138
Number of meals per day
SCTP*d2014 0.226*** 0.174** 0.278***
[3.51] [2.36] [3.03]
FISP*d2014 0.054 −0.016 0.131
[0.92] [−0.13] [1.57]
Joint impact SCT&FISP 0.244*** 0.226** 0.237***
[3.25] [2.17] [2.88]
Incremental impact of FISP on SCTP 0.018 0.05 −0.04
[0.3] [0.64] [−0.42]
Incremental impact of SCTP on FISP 0.190** 0.241** 0.11
[2.79] [2.04] [0.87]
Complementarity −0.036 0.07 −0.17
[−0.42] [0.46] [−1.34
R2 0.100 0.13 0.1259
Caloric intake in the past 7 days per adult equivalent
SCTP*d2014 113.545 40.594 326.939
[1.03] [0.39] [1.45]
FISP*d2014 −94.816 −148.706 46.611
[−1.66] [−1.60] [0.31]
Joint impact SCT&FISP 103.907 91.432 240.37
[0.62] [0.48] [1.29]
Incremental impact of FISP on SCTP −9.638 50.839 −86.57
[−0.07] [0.34] [−0.5]
Incremental impact of SCTP on FISP 198.72 240.14 193.76
[1.1] [1.17] [0.96]
(continued )
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Table D2. (Continued)
All Labour unconstrained Labour constrained
Complementarity 85.18 199.54 −133.18
[0.58] [1.16] [−0.57]
R2 0.1271 0.1397 0.2236
Caloric intake from purchased food per adult equivalent
SCTP*d2014 122.04 36.86 326.518**
[1.17] [0.30] [2.55]
FISP*d2014 6.812 −46.622 108.267
[0.08] [−0.46] [1.06]
Joint impact SCT&FISP 149.456* 124.957 245.018*
[1.81] [0.96] [1.78]
Incremental impact of FISP on SCTP 27.42 88.10 −81.50
[0.34] [1.04] [−0.65]
Incremental impact of SCTP on FISP 142.64 171.58 136.751
[1.14] [1.27] [1.01]
Complementarity 20.60 134.72 −189.77
[0.17] [0.98] [−1.23]
R2 0.2185 0.1895 0.3492
Caloric intake from produced food per adult equivalent
SCTP*d2014 −48.521 −23.437 −88.974
[−0.74] [−0.33] [−1.35]
FISP*d2014 −6.74 −7.456 −21.19
[−0.31] [−0.25] [−0.85]
Joint impact SCT&FISP −33.571 −0.653 −67.45
[−0.53] [−0.01] [−0.86]
Incremental impact of FISP on SCTP 14.950 22.784 21.524
[0.84] [0.85] [0.64]
Incremental impact of SCTP on FISP −26.831 6.803 −46.260
[−0.43] [0.12] [−0.63]
Complementarity 21.69 30.240 42.714
[0.82] [0.78] [1.03]
R2 0.2999 0.3191 0.314
Caloric intake from gifts per adult equivalent
SCTP*d2014 −7.539* −3.867 −11.540**
[−1.74] [−0.93] [−2.08]
FISP*d2014 4.225 1.481 8.283**
[1.48] [0.41] [2.37]
Joint impact SCT&FISP −3.03 −1.784 −3.967
[−0.64] [−0.39] [−0.69]
Incremental impact of FISP on SCTP 4.509** 2.083 7.573***
[1.97] [0.56] [3.34
Incremental impact of SCTP on FISP −7.255 −3.265 −12.25*
[−1.34] [−0.55] [−1.92]
Complementarity 0.284 0.602 −0.710
[0.08] [0.12] [−0.19]
R2 0.155 0.1435 0.2296
Observations 3214 1806 1408
Notes: Statistical significance at the 99% (***), 95 (**) and 90% (**) confidence levels. Robust t-statistics
clustered at the community level are in brackets. All estimations control for baseline head of household’s
characteristics, household demographic composition and size, a vector of contemporaneous cluster level prices,
a set of exogenous shocks, and district fixed effect, and are adjusted with the GPS weighting. Confidence intervals
consider heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered at the community level.
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5 D.3 Impact on agricultural inputs
FISP significantly increases the percentage of users and quantity of chemical fertilisers used, and increases the
percentage of users of improved or hybrid seeds (see Table D3). Both results are clearly expected due to the nature
of the programme. Overall, the joint impact is positive and significant only for chemical fertilisers and the
synergies between the two programmes seem to be weak. Unfortunately our data does not contain information on
the use of commercial fertiliser and commercial seeds. Therefore, we are not able to assess whether FISP induced
crowding-out of commercial inputs and whether the total use of chemical fertilisers changed. The impact on the
value of production and on crop production seem to suggest that the total use of input increased but, unfortunately,
we are not able to quantify the total increase, net of potential crowding-out. However, previous contribution in the
literature (Mason & Jayne, 2013; Ricker-Gilbert et al., 2011) document that ‘crowding-out’ of commercial
fertiliser tends to be less when subsidy programmes are targeted to relatively poor farmers, which is the bulk of
our sample.
Table D3. Impact on agricultural inputs
% HH that use: Quantity
% HH that use: All
Labour
unconstrained
Labour
constrained All
Labour
unconstrained
Labour
constrained
Chemical fertilisers
SCTP*d2014 0.058 −0.004 0.096 2.378 1.171 2.305
[0.85] [−0.04] [1.01] [0.99] [0.34] [0.65]
FISP*d2014 0.472*** 0.354*** 0.562*** 21.638*** 15.819*** 26.205***
[7.95] [3.55] [13.88] [7.80] [3.57] [7.93]
Joint impact SCT&FISP 0.338*** 0.284*** 0.435*** 21.952*** 21.792*** 22.380***
[5.03] [3.78] [4.17] [7.46] [6.20] [4.96]
Incremental impact of
FISP on SCTP
0.279*** 0.288** 0.339** 19.574*** 20.621*** 20.075***
[4.04] [2.97] [2.82] [5.49] [4.08] [3.8]
Incremental impact of
SCTP on FISP
−0.134** −0.07 −0.127 0.314 5.972 −3.825
[−2.12] [−0.89] [−1.26] [0.10] [1.51] [−0.9]
Complementarity −0.192** −0.066 −0.223* −2.063 4.802 −6.13
[−2.09] [−0.49] [−1.75] [−0.47] [0.77] [−1]
R2 0.2783 0.2901 0.3149 0.2284 0.2397 0.2917
Organic fertilisers Value (MWK real values)
SCTP*d2014 0.046 −0.009 0.122 213.131* 207.302 208.637*
[0.64] [−0.09] [1.50] [1.92] [1.38] [1.79]
FISP*d2014 −0.082 −0.072 −0.083 −201.953** −178.551* −221.040***
[−1.35] [−0.85] [−1.46] [−2.65] [−1.81] [−2.81]
Joint impact SCT&FISP −0.069 −0.158 0.077 114.853 91.057 162.463
[−0.75] [−1.32] [0.94] [0.93] [0.56] [1.39]
Incremental impact of
FISP on SCTP
−0.115 −0.149 −0.045 −98.278 −116.246 −46.175
[−1.81] [−1.36] [−0.70] [−1.04] [0.65] [−0.63]
Incremental impact of
SCTP on FISP
0.013 −0.086 0.160* 316.806*** 269.607** 383.503***
[0.16] [−0.81] [1.86] [2.94] [1.96] [3.38]
Complementarity −0.033 −0.077 0.038 103.675 62.305 174.866*
[−0.36] [−0.53] [0.46] [0.86] [0.31] [1.77]
R2 0.0993 0.0885 0.1431 0.1032 0.0894 0.1640
Pesticides
SCTP*d2014 −0.004 −0.02 0.012
[−0.25] [−0.74] [0.95]
FISP*d2014 −0.01 −0.023 0.001
[−0.74] [−1.16] [0.06]
Joint impact SCT&FISP 0.031 −0.004 0.062**
(continued )
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Table D3. (Continued)
% HH that use: Quantity
% HH that use: All
Labour
unconstrained
Labour
constrained All
Labour
unconstrained
Labour
constrained
[1.60] [−0.15] [2.68]
Incremental impact of
FISP on SCTP
0.035** 0.015 0.051*
[2.39] [0.54] [1.94]
Incremental impact of
SCTP on FISP
0.041** 0.019 0.062**
[2.46] [0.77] [2.33]
Complementarity 0.045** 0.039 0.05
[2.36] [1.21] [1.61]
R2 0.0780 0.1352 0.084
Improved or hybrid
seeds
SCTP*d2014 0.05 −0.021 0.118*
[1.04] [−0.36] [1.67]
FISP*d2014 0.125*** 0.121* 0.136*
[3.32] [1.96] [1.98]
Joint impact SCT&FISP 0.115 0.087 0.171*
[1.49] [1.01] [1.93]
Incremental impact of
FISP on SCTP
0.065 0.108 0.053
[0.83] [1.13] [0.76]
Incremental impact of
SCTP on FISP
−0.01 −0.034 0.035
[−0.11] [−0.31] [0.37]
Complementarity −0.06 −0.013 −0.083
[−0.67] [−0.11] [−0.82]
R2 0.1668 0.1537 0.2182
Observations 3214 1806 1408
Notes: Statistical significance at the 99% (***), 95 (**) and 90% (**) confidence levels. Robust t-statistics
clustered at the community level are in brackets. All estimations control for baseline head of household’s
characteristics, household demographic composition and size, a vector of contemporaneous cluster level prices,
a set of exogenous shocks, and district fixed effect, and are adjusted with the GPS weighting. Confidence intervals
consider heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered at the community level.
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